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Abstract 
The limitations of access to finance in Africa, together with the recent boom in 
cell phone use in that continent, created high expectations regarding the 
introduction of mobile money in many African countries. The success story of 
M-PESA in Kenya raised the bar further. We designed and conducted a field 
experiment to assess the impact of randomized mobile money dissemination in 
rural Mozambique. For this purpose we benefit from the fact that mobile money 
was only recently launched in the country, allowing for the identification of a 
pure control group. This paper reports on the first results of this ongoing project 
after the first wave of dissemination efforts in rural locations, which included 
the recruitment and training of mobile money agents, community meetings and 
theaters, as well as individual rural campaigning. Administrative and behavioral 
data both show clear adherence to the services in the treatment group. Financial 
literacy and trust outcomes are also positively affected by the treatment. We 
present behavioral evidence that the marginal willingness to remit was increased 
by the availability of mobile money. Finally, we observe a tendency for mobile 
money to substitute traditional alternatives for both savings and remittances. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Access to financial services is extremely limited in many parts of the world. In sub-Saharan 
Africa, less than one in five households have a bank account, meaning deficient access to formal 
savings. Africans also face substantial costs and risks when sending or receiving remittances: 
Africa includes the top five most expensive remittance corridors in world.1 At the same time, the 
use of cell phones has been dramatically changing the African landscape: the take-up rate 
increased by 550 percent in the five years up to 2009. African cell phone subscribers are now 
estimated to have exceeded 500 millions, surpassing the number of cell phone subscribers in the 
US.2 This extensive spread of cell-phone technology has the potential to be used for many more 
purposes than simple voice communication and text messaging. One such example is mobile 
money. 
 
Mobile money was made popular by Safaricom’s M-PESA in Kenya, which started in March 
2007. By September 2009, US$3.7 billion (close to 10 percent of Kenya’s GDP) had been 
transferred over the system. In April 2011, M-PESA had 14 million subscribers and close to 28 
thousand agents.3 Mobile money typically allows four types of basic transactions: (i) cashing-in at 
a mobile-money agent (i.e. exchanging physical cash for e-money usable on the cell phone); (ii) 
transferring e-money to another cell phone number; (iii) paying for products or services at shops 
taking e-money; (iv) cashing-out (i.e. exchanging e-money for physical money at an agent outlet).  
 
This paper is to the best of our knowledge the first experimental piece of causal evidence on the 
impact of introducing mobile money technology. But several previous non-experimental studies 
described the experience of M-PESA in Kenya. Mbiti and Weil (2010) identify increased 
frequency and overall volume of urban-rural money transfers as the main driving force behind the 
success of M-PESA. They also emphasize that M-PESA is frequently used as a storage-savings 
device for safety considerations. Jack and Suri (2011) describe the M-PESA experience in detail 
and raise a number of interesting potential economic effects and underlying mechanisms of 
                                                 
1 The figure on holding a formal bank account comes from a Gallup survey conducted in 18 Sub-Saharan 
African countries in 2009. The costs of remittances are monitored by the World Bank at 
remittanceprices.worldbank.org. See the report ‘Financing Africa: Through the Crisis and Beyond’, 2011, 
sponsored by the African Development Bank, the World Bank, and Germany’s Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development for additional descriptive data in support of low breadth and high 
cost of financial services in Africa. 
2 See the report ‘Information Economy Report’, 2009, by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development. 
3 Safaricom, 2011. 
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mobile money. At the household level, these effects may range from impacts on saving and 
investment, to risk spreading and insurance. Mas and Morawczynski (2009) highlight appropriate 
liquidity management of rural agents (i.e., their ability to meet customer requests for cash 
withdrawals), and transparent pricing as crucial attributes of a successful mobile money product. 
 
The project we describe in this paper is an ongoing impact evaluation (randomized control trial) 
of the introduction of mobile money in rural locations of Mozambique. In this country, mobile 
money has been launched in 2011 by Mozambican Carteira Móvel and is branded as mKesh. Our 
project aims to establish the causal effects of mobile money for a rural panel of households. We 
are particularly interested in adoption of mobile money, effects on savings and remittances as 
mediators for impact on more fundamental outcomes, such as patterns of consumption and 
investment.  
 
Our hypothesis is that the introduction of a relatively safe and cheap mobile money technology in 
rural locations will likely trigger substitution effects both on saving and remittance behavior. This 
substitution would imply adoption of the new technology instead of the most commonly used 
traditional technologies, both for saving (mostly keeping cash in cans buried underground) and 
transferring money (mainly in person or via bus drivers, a channels that was reportedly expensive, 
risky, and time consuming).  
 
A particular focus of this project (motivated by the M-PESA experience) is the remittance 
channel: for this reason, in addition to and following mKesh dissemination in rural locations, we 
will conduct dissemination of mobile money services among urban migrants related to the rural 
households we interviewed. Our hypothesis is that dissemination of mobile money among these 
migrants may increase remittances to the corresponding rural experimental locations. This paper 
reports on outcomes gathered from rural experimental subjects from immediately after to two 
months after rural dissemination, just before urban migrant dissemination. 
 
Our field experiment reached 102 rural enumeration areas (EAs) in the provinces of Maputo-
Province, Gaza, and Inhambane. In half of these locations, a set of mKesh dissemination activities 
took place. These activities included the recruitment and training of an mKesh agent in each 
treatment location, a community theatre and a community meeting where mKesh services were 
explained to the local population, and a set of individual dissemination activities. The individual 
level activities included registration with mKesh and experimentation of several mKesh 
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functionalities with trial money provided by the campaign team. 2040 individuals in total were 
randomly sampled to take part of the study. A random sub-group of the individuals we follow in 
treatment locations were actually not given the individual treatment, although they had free 
access to the technology, in order to allow for the measurement of spillover effects.  
 
In this paper, we focus on outcomes related to the adoption of mobile money services 
(particularly transfers and savings), as well as to information and trust outcomes of the mobile 
money dissemination intervention that took place in treatment areas. Data on outcomes were 
gathered from the mobile money operator’s administrative records of transactions, from face-to-
face individual surveying, and from behavioral measurements after mKesh dissemination. In 
particular, we examine results on adoption of mKesh using both administrative records and face-
to-face behavioral measures based on simple games of the marginal propensity to save and remit 
– where conventional channels and mobile money were both made available. Information and 
trust experimental outcomes are based on survey outcomes obtained using techniques to minimize 
subjective scale bias.  
 
We find promising results on mKesh adoption in the rural treatment locations. According to 
administrative data from the mobile money operator, 64 percent of the sample of treated 
individuals conducted at least one transaction using this mobile money service after the 
dissemination activities (in the period until approximately two months after the end of the 
fieldwork). In addition, 81 percent of our treated individuals did not want to withdraw the initial 
cash balance (about 2 USD) they got in their cell phone, despite availability of assistance to make 
the withdrawal by the mKesh campaign team. These results on adoption and trust in mKesh are 
consistent with clear improvements in general financial literacy and specific knowledge about 
mKesh, following its dissemination in treatment areas, and also with an increase in the trust on 
the local agent and mCel financial services with the intervention.  
 
Finally, we show that the marginal willingness to send remittances gathered from a simple game 
conducted with all individuals in our study who had migrants in their families increased by 6-7 
percent when contrasting treatment and control groups. Marginal willingness to save in an 
analogous game was not affected. Also in these games, we identify a clear preference for using 
mKesh for both saving and remitting instead of conventional channels. Overall these results point 
to the clear potential of mKesh to be adopted in rural locations of Mozambique, to improve 
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financial literacy, and to increase remittances, as well as to substitute for other means of saving 
and remitting. 
 
This paper is related to the literatures on savings and remittances, and the use of cell-phone 
technology in developing countries. Karlan and Murdoch (2010) call for the understanding of the 
impact that introducing new technology may have on savings, as unintended consequences are 
possible: liquidity may carry self-control problems (as in Ashraf et al, 2006) and exacerbate 
social pressure (consistent with Dupas and Robinson, 2012b). Despite these concerns, Dupas and 
Robinson (2012a, 2012b) show that access to non-interest-bearing bank accounts in rural Kenya 
significantly increased savings, a finding that highlights the demand for savings products in rural 
settings.  
 
Existing evidence supports the idea that migrants significantly increase the value of remittances 
sent when transfer costs are decreased (Aycinena et al., 2012). Ultimately this line of work aims 
to find changes in development outcomes through an increase in remittances. That is one of the 
primary objectives of the field experiment we describe here, even though we still cannot establish 
it with the data available. As made clear in the literature review by Yang (2011), despite several 
attempts at it, there is still no conclusive experimental evidence that migrant remittances have (or 
not) productive effects. Yang (2008) was closest by employing exchange rate shocks induced by 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis: he finds that increased migrant resources produced by exchange 
rate appreciation are used primarily for investment in origin households, rather than for current 
consumption. This investment takes the form of educational expenditures and entrepreneurial 
activities. This is line with other studies focusing on African countries: on the impact of migration 
on education in Cape Verde (Batista et al, 2012) and on entrepreneurship in Mozambique (Batista 
et al, 2013).  
 
The current paper also links to the emerging literature on the effects of information and 
communication technology on various development outcomes. Jensen (2007) looks at the use of 
cell phones to improve market efficiency in a local fish market in India. Aker (2010) studies the 
effects of cell phone introduction on grain market outcomes in Niger. Aker et al. (2010) analyze 
the impact of civic education provided through cell phones on electoral behavior in the 2009 
Mozambican elections. 
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This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide background for the introduction of 
mobile money in Mozambique. Section 3 presents the experimental design, including treatment, 
sampling, measurement, and specifications. Section 4 displays the econometric results: balance 
tests, adoption outcomes, and impact of mobile money dissemination on information and trust, 
and savings and remittances, including spillovers. Section 5 provides concluding remarks. 
 
2. Background 
 
In Mozambique there are over five million subscribers of mobile phone services (corresponding 
to nearly one fourth of the population). Geographical coverage extends to 80 percent of the 
population.4 A competitive market composed by state-owned mCel and Vodacom (a subsidiary of 
the South-African multinational) has been in place since 2003. A third operating license has 
recently been attributed to Movitel, a consortium majority-owned by Vietnamese Viettel.  
 
Mozambican authorities passed legislation in 2004 that allows mobile operators to partner with 
financial institutions in order to provide mobile money services. 5 Under this legislation, together 
with an operating license issued in 2010, mCel established a new company, Carteira Móvel, 
which started offering mobile money services, branded as mKesh, in January 2011.6 In an initial 
effort to recruit mKesh agents, Carteira Móvel recruited 1000 agents in just a few months after 
September 2011. However, these agents were based mainly in urban locations, particularly in the 
Maputo city. In this context, Carteira Móvel regarded the launching of this research project as the 
perfect opportunity to test the impact of mKesh dissemination in rural locations of the country. 
 
Indeed the potential of mobile money in rural Mozambique is enormous. Bank branches simply 
do not reach beyond province capitals and some (but few) district capitals.7 Saving methods for 
the rural population are often limited to hiding money ‘under the mattress’ (or, more precisely, in 
cans buried underground), keeping money with local traders or authorities, and participating in 
                                                 
4 Computed from data made available by mCel and Vodacom. 
5 The latest version of the Law regulating Credit and Financial Institutions is Law 15/99 from November 
1st. 
6 Note, however, that the formal mKesh launch and first advertising campaign of this service on national 
media was only aired in September 2011. 
7 From the list of bank agencies made available by the Bank of Mozambique in December 2011, for the 18 
districts that we cover in our study, only 37 bank agencies are reported to exist in those districts (just over 
two on average per district, where each district has an average population of 170,000 inhabitants). 
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ROSCAs.8 None of these arrangements typically pays interest, and some of them carry 
considerable risks.  
 
Perhaps even more significantly for the case of money transfers, these transfers typically require: 
either the rural individual to travel to the urban bank branch to send or receive a bank transfer, or 
the sender to travel to the location of the recipient of the transfer, or the sending of the money 
through a bus driver or other person. All these alternatives involve considerable costs, and some 
of them considerable risks: indeed Mozambique is reported to be in the top four countries in 
terms of most expensive remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa.9 Mobile money services as provided 
through mKesh offer the possibility of saving securely, and transferring money much faster, more 
securely and at considerably lower costs than the existing alternative channels. 
 
3. Experimental design 
 
3.1. Treatment 
 
The treatment, consisting of the dissemination of the mKesh services in 51 EAs of Maputo-
Province, Gaza, and Inhambane, was provided in coordination with Carteira Móvel, the mobile 
money operator in Mozambique. The treatment activities were divided into three phases: (i) the 
recruitment and training of mKesh agents, (ii) the holding of a community theater and of a 
community meeting describing mKesh, and (iii) individual dissemination of mKesh with our 
panel of survey respondents. 
 
The first phase consisted in the recruitment of one mKesh agent per EA (March-May 2012). 
These were typically local vendors of groceries who had a cement shop. Three main criteria were 
sought when proposing local vendors to become mKesh agents: they had to have a large number 
of clients in their village (having full shelves was taken as an indicator of that condition), they 
needed a formal license to operate as vendors, and they needed a bank account. Each EA was 
visited on purpose for the recruitment of the agents. Training of the agents followed in a second 
visit. At this point in time, the contract signed by Carteira Móvel as well as agent materials were 
handed out to the agents. The materials included an official poster (to identify the shop as an 
                                                 
8 We report for the sample of rural households that we study the following statistics: 63 percent save money 
at home, 30 percent save money with a local trader, and 21 percent participate in a ROSCA. Only 21 
percent report any money saved in a bank account. 
9 See remittanceprices.worldbank.org. 
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mKesh agent), other mKesh advertising posters, and an agent cell phone to be used exclusively 
for all mKesh transactions. A briefing describing the remaining dissemination activities was held 
at this point. This included a description of the community theater and community meeting to be 
held in the village, and the review of mKesh operations, with an emphasis on self-registrations of 
clients, deposits, purchases in shop, and withdrawals. 
 
The second phase of the treatment included a community theater and a community meeting. They 
were typically held one after the other in close proximity to the agent’s shop. These events were 
advertised during our baseline survey with the help of local authorities. The playing of the mKesh 
jingle from the mKesh shop also helped drawing attention to the events. The script of the 
community theater (available upon request) was the same for all treatment locations, and included 
mentions of mKesh safety (based on a PIN number), savings using mKesh, transfers using 
mKesh, and the self-registration process with mKesh. The context was a village scene, with a 
household head and his family and neighbors. The community meeting, which had the presence 
of village authorities, gave a structured overview of the mKesh service, and allowed interaction 
with the community as questions and answers followed the initial presentation. 
 
The third phase of the dissemination activities was conducted at the individual level for our 
targeted individuals, i.e., those approached individually by mKesh campaigners. The individual 
treatment was based on a leaflet distributed to the targeted individuals. This leaflet had a full 
description of the operations made available by mKesh while providing the cell phone menus to 
be used for each. The leaflet is displayed in Figure 1. 
 
<Figure 1 near here> 
 
Campaigners described the leaflet and asked targeted individuals whether they wanted to register 
to the mKesh services. In the affirmative case, they helped targeted individuals following the self-
registration menu. This implied writing name/surname and providing the number of an identity 
card. Then campaigners offered to deposit in the mKesh account of each targeted individual 76 
Meticais (around 3 USD). Targeted individuals had to accompany the campaigners to the mKesh 
shop. The deposit menu was then followed with the mKesh agent for the purpose of depositing 
the 76 Meticais. After the deposit was made, campaigners helped targeted individuals checking 
their balance in their mKesh accounts. Subsequently, each targeted individual was asked to buy 
anything in the agent’s shop for the value of 20 Meticais. This transaction was then made in the 
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presence of the agent, which implied a commission of 1 Metical. Finally, targeted individuals 
were explained how a transfer could be done to another cell phone and how they could withdraw 
the remaining 50 Meticais in their account (this operation would imply a 5 Meticais commission, 
which would make the total 76 Meticais deposited by campaigners in each account). These 
operations were not conducted at this point. Targeted individuals were also briefed about the 
pricing structure of the mKesh services (which makes a page in the mKesh leaflet). Please see 
Figure 1 for all the menus followed by campaigners during the process just described. 
 
The community and theater meetings as well as the individual treatment were conducted in the 
period June-August 2012.10 
 
3.2. Sampling and randomization 
 
Our study concerns 102 EAs in the provinces of Maputo-Province, Gaza, and Inhambane. These 
EAs were sampled randomly from the 2008 Mozambican census for the referred provinces; note 
however the exception of Maputo-Province, for which only its northern districts were considered. 
Two additional criteria had to be observed for an EA to be included in our sampling framework. 
First, the EA had to be covered by mCel signal – this was first checked by drawing 5-km radii 
from the geographical coordinates of each mCel antenna, and then by verifying the signal at the 
actual location of each EA. Second, the district of the EA had to have at least one bank agency. 
For the purpose of identifying the sampling framework as described, mCel made available the 
geographical data on its antennae, and the Bank of Mozambique made available the data on the 
location of all bank agencies in the country. 
 
The individuals that took part in this study were drawn at the household level. We sought 
household heads while following an n-th house walk departing from the center of the EA along 
the main directions of walk in the EA. However, additional conditions had to be observed by 
households to be included in our sample. All sampled households had to have an mCel cell phone 
number. In addition, but only for half sample, the household head had to have a spouse or 
son/daughter living in the Maputo city area, i.e., a close migrant in Maputo city. This migrant had 
to have an mCel cell phone number. 2040 individuals responded the baseline survey, which 
served the purpose of identifying all experimental subjects before the community-level and 
                                                 
10 Visit www.novafrica.org for photos and films that depict some of the activities undertaken at the 
community and individual level. 
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individual-level treatment activities. The baseline survey was a fully-fledged household survey 
that also covered consumption and investment patterns of the corresponding households. We 
interviewed 20 individuals per EA. 
 
The randomization of mKesh dissemination was performed by forming blocks of two EAs from 
the set of 102 EAs. The blocks were selected by matching on shortest geographical distance. The 
51 treatment EAs were then drawn randomly within each block. See Figure 2 for the location of 
the 102 EAs in our study, divided between treatment and control. Note that the treatment at the 
individual level as well as invitations for the community events as described above were 
submitted to a subsample of the individuals in treatment locations. This subsample had on 
average four individuals per EA and was drawn randomly within the EA. We call the individuals 
that were given the individual treatment and the invitations within a treatment EA the targeted 
individuals, and the individuals that were not given the individual treatment and the invitations 
the untargeted individuals. 
 
<Figure 2 near here> 
 
 
3.3. Measurement 
 
Our measurement can be divided into adoption behavioral variables, survey variables related to 
information and trust, and behavioral measures of marginal willingness to save and to remit to 
migrants in the family. All measures that required the physical presence of the experimental 
subjects were taken immediately after the individual treatment was submitted.11 Some adoption 
variables including administrative data on the transactions conducted by our panel are available 
for two months after the mKesh dissemination was finished on all treatment locations. 
 
Our main adoption measures were taken from the administrative records of transactions carried 
out by our targeted and untargeted individuals in treatment locations. These records were made 
available by Carteira Móvel until the two months after the treatment was finished, i.e., until 
October 2012. They include for each cell number registered with us and for each transaction 
conducted: the date of the transaction, the type of transaction, and the amount involved in the 
transaction. 
                                                 
11 These measurements had 1 percent attrition when comparing to the baseline survey. 
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Another adoption outcome to which we devote some attention was composed from observing 
whether targeted individuals accepted the invitation to withdraw the cash they received as mKesh 
balance during the individual treatment (after the purchase at the agent’s shop was carried out). 
This balance was 55 Meticais (which included 5 Meticais commission in case the withdrawal was 
actually done), around 2 USD. This invitation was posed at the end of the individual treatment, as 
the beginning of the post-treatment measurement activities. In case the invitation was accepted 
interviewers were available to help respondents withdrawing the mKesh balance. 
 
During the post-treatment measurement activities we also proposed respondents in treatment 
locations two kinds of actions based on the sending of SMS (text) messages to our hotline. Both 
actions were meant to give a credible (behavioral) indication of whether these individuals were 
planning to use (or using already) mKesh services. Both actions involved the cost of writing and 
sending an SMS which could be small but is positive, giving some assurance of incentive-
compatibility. 
 
Our first SMS proposal was termed SMS mKesh. Individuals were proposed to send an SMS 
saying what part of mKesh they liked the most. A leaflet was left with the respondent explaining 
SMS mKesh. This is in Figure 3. Our written example referred liking saving money on mKesh, 
but any other service(s) offered by mKesh or any other aspect of the mKesh branding could be 
referred. The incentive to send the SMS was presented as: if many SMS were received, Carteira 
Móvel would try to improve the service focusing on the expressed preferences. The SMS mKesh 
could be sent until August 31. 
  
<Figure 3 near here> 
 
Our second SMS proposal was termed SMS mKesh Migrant. Individuals in treatment locations 
were proposed to contact close migrants in their family (spouse and or sons/daughters) that live in 
the Maputo city area. The cell phone numbers of these migrants were known to us from the 
baseline survey. They would ask these migrants to send an SMS saying they knew about the 
possibility of transferring money through mKesh. A leaflet was distributed to respondents 
explaining SMS mKesh Migrant. This is in Figure 4. The incentive to send the SMS was that both 
the respondent and the migrant would receive 50 Meticais in MKesh balance. The SMS mKesh 
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Migrant could be sent until August 31, with mKesh balance being transferred shortly after that 
date. 
 
<Figure 4 near here> 
 
We now turn to survey measurements related to information and trust. These survey questions 
were submitted as part of the post-treatment activities. The information questions were on 
financial literacy and on knowledge about mKesh. The literacy questions focused on whether 
respondents knew what savings, transfers, deposits, withdrawals are. All these concepts were 
mentioned and exemplified during the community and theater meetings and individual treatment. 
The mKesh questions tested knowledge about the link to mCel, the range of services that mKesh 
offers, and the role mKesh agents have on those services. The trust questions were of two kinds: 
general trust on family neighbors, local traders, and cell phone operators; trust on savings and 
transfers. The trust questions on savings and transfers measured trust on money saved with local 
trader, money transferred through driver, money transferred through family member, money 
transferred through bank transfer, and money transferred through ‘new mCel bank’. For each of 
these questions we gave respondents two anchoring vignette questions in which we presented the 
extreme positive and negative trust scenarios for the corresponding question. We used the 
answers to the two vignette-questions to rescale answers given to the corresponding trust question 
for each individual. Table 1 presents the exact phrasing of these survey questions. 
 
<Table 1 near here> 
 
Finally, we conducted simple games to elicit the marginal willingness to save and remit to close 
migrants in the family living in the Maputo city area. Moreover, we distinguished between 
savings or remittances using mKesh, and savings or remittances using an attractive baseline 
alternative. 
 
The savings game gave all individuals in both treatment and control locations 20 Meticais 
(around 1 USD) in cash. The respondent could either keep the 20 Meticais in cash or ‘save’ them. 
If the respondent answered he/she wanted to ‘save’, the respondent had to make an additional 
decision. ‘Saving’ could be through depositing the 20 Meticais in the respondent’s mKesh 
account, or through default saving. Default saving in rural Mozambique typically means saving 
under the mattress. So we proposed the following type of default saving: depositing the 20 
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Meticais on a sealed envelope kept with the respondent, which would give the right to receive 5 
Meticais in interest at the time of the next visit of the enumeration team, in case the envelope was 
still sealed at the time of that visit. See sealed envelope used in Figure 5. Note that the time of the 
next visit was uncertain when this game was run. The possibility of interest was meant to break 
indifference between cash-in-hand and cash-in-envelope. That way, in case there was already 
money under the mattress, the sealed envelope would become the most valuable 20-Metical bill 
under the mattress. It may be also seen as a hard test for the adoption of mKesh for saving. 
 
<Figure 5 near here> 
 
The remittance game also gave all individuals in both treatment and control locations 20 Meticais 
(around 1 USD) in cash. The respondent could either keep the 20 Meticais in cash or remit them 
to a close migrant in the family living in the Maputo city area. If the respondent answered he/she 
wanted to remit, the respondent had to make an additional decision. The remittance could be sent 
through transferring the 20 Meticais through the respondent’s mKesh account, or through default 
remitting. A default remittance in rural Mozambique typically means sending money through 
someone, be it a family member, a friend, or a bus driver. So we proposed the following type of 
default remittance: sending the 20 Meticais in an envelope through ‘us’ (the enumeration team), 
without any costs. See Figure 5 for the envelope used for this purpose. We also believe this to be 
an attractive alternative to mKesh as we were giving the money to begin with and so there was no 
reason not to trust us to take the money to the migrant, and as we did not charge anything for the 
remittance (something highly unusual for the typical default options people have in 
Mozambique). Note that we also ran a version of the remittance game that did not allow 
respondents to keep the cash: respondents could only choose whether to send the remittance 
through mKesh or to send the remittance through ‘us’. This version of the remittance game, 
which aims to assess adoption of mKesh for making transfers, was only run in treatment 
locations. 
 
3.4. Specifications 
 
Our empirical approach is based on estimating treatment effects on a variety of outcome 
variables. Namely, we are primarily interested in treatment effects on mKesh adoption (by 
comparing targeted and untargeted individuals within treatment locations), information and trust, 
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and savings and remittances. We now describe the main econometric specifications we employed, 
while using data at the individual level, for the estimation of these parameters. 
 
Our design allowed us to estimate average treatment effects in different ways. Most simply, the 
effect of interest (d) could be estimated through the specifications: 
 
	
 =  + 	 + 	
, (1) 
 
	
 =  + ℎ
 + 	
, (2) 
 
where Outcome is an outcome of interest, i,l are identifiers for individuals and locations, 	 is a 
an dummy variable taking value 1 for targeted individuals within treatment locations, 0 
otherwise, and 
 is a dummy variable taking value 1 for treatment locations, 0 otherwise. 
 
We use equation (1) with data on treatment locations only for estimating the difference for some 
adoption measures between targeted and untargeted individuals within treatment locations. 
Adoption was very unlikely in control locations. We will employ equation (2) for estimating the 
difference between targeted and control individuals, our main experimental results (by employing 
data on targeted and control individuals only), and the difference between untargeted and control 
individuals (by employing data on untargeted and control individuals only). The latter is an 
approximation of indirect effects of the treatment or spillover effects. 
 
Because of small sample size, we can also add location and individual-level control variables to 
compose one of our main specifications. This is in line with Duflo et al. (2007), who argue that, 
although controls do not generally change the estimate for the average treatment effect, they can 
help explaining the dependent variable, and therefore typically lower the standard error of the 
coefficient of interest. We then have the following core specifications: 
 
	
 =  + 
 + 	 + 	 + 	
, (3) 
 
	
 =  + 
 +  	 + ℎ
 + 	
, (4) 
 
where 
 is a location-level vector of controls including regional dummies, and 	 	is a vector of 
individual (demographic) controls. We display results for specifications (1)-(2) and for two 
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versions of specifications (3)-(4), one with regional dummies only, and the other with all location 
and individual controls. 
 
For simplicity and transparency in the presentation of results we employ OLS on all estimations 
in this paper. We cluster standard errors at the level of the EA in all regressions at the individual 
level. 
 
4. Econometric results 
 
4.1. Balance 
 
We begin by showing balance tests for a wide range of baseline variables. In Tables 2 we analyze 
location characteristics and demographic traits of our panel of experimental subjects, including 
basic attributes (age, gender, education, and marital status), occupation, religion and ethnicity, 
income and property, technology use and finance. At the location level we contrast treatment and 
control locations. At the individual level, we are able to compare control individuals with 
individuals in treatment locations that were reached individually by mKesh campaigners, i.e., 
targeted individuals, and with individuals that were not individually approached by campaigners, 
i.e. untargeted individuals. Because all these variables are unaffected by the intervention, and 
given our treatment assignment criteria, any differences between comparison groups should be 
understood as a product of chance. 
 
<Tables 2 near here> 
 
Among location characteristics we only find one difference between treatment and control that is 
statistically significant. Electricity supply is higher in control locations, but this difference is only 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level. At the individual level, we do not find differences 
across the three groups of respondents for basic demographics (age, gender, education, and 
marital status), occupation, religion and ethnicity, technology use and finance. We do however 
observe some differences for income and property. Specifically, owning some kinds of animals 
(goats and chickens) is more frequent in treatment locations (both targeted and untargeted 
individuals are more likely to have chickens when compared to control individuals. Moreover, we 
also observe differences on the variables relating to owning fridges and to owning radios: but this 
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time it is less frequent that targeted individuals own this type of durables, when comparing to 
control respondents. 
 
4.2. Adoption 
 
We begin by analyzing administrative records from Carteira Móvel on mKesh transactions of our 
rural experimental subjects. At this point in time we have access to two months of data after the 
mKesh dissemination efforts finished in the field in early August. We analyze here a range of 
indicators of mKesh use at the individual level: first we consider all types of transactions; then we 
distinguish between deposits, transfers received, transfers sent, purchases in shop, airtime 
purchases, and withdrawals. For each of these types of mKesh use, we display three types of 
outcomes: whether that transaction was performed at least once, the average value of transactions 
(in Meticais), and the number of transactions. Note that the average value of transactions and the 
number of transactions are considered for those that actually performed the transaction at least 
once. We focus on simple averages for treatment locations and this is what we display in Tables 3 
on the top row (with standard deviation). We also estimate the treatment effect in terms of the 
same outcomes by comparing targeted to untargeted individuals within treatment locations. 
Specifications (1) and (3) are used: we first employ a specification without controls, then we add 
regional dummies, and finally we add location and individual controls to the regional dummies.12 
These are secondary results: we may interpret this difference as coming from the fact that only 
targeted respondents were invited to attend the community meeting and theatre, and were 
approached for individual treatment by campaigners. However, untargeted individuals still live in 
locations where an mKesh agent was recruited, and may still have attended the public events of 
mKesh dissemination. Hence, it is likely that the treatment has impact on their behavior as well. 
 
<Tables 3 near here> 
 
We observe considerable levels of mKesh adoption. Overall, we report that 64 percent of our 
experimental subjects in treatment locations did at least one transaction in the period after 
dissemination of mKesh until approximately two months after the last day of mKesh 
dissemination activities in the treatment EAs. The average value of mKesh transactions at the 
                                                 
12 Location controls include whether the location has a primary school, a secondary school, a health center, 
market vendors, police, church, meeting point, electricity supply, sewage, quality of mCel coverage, and 
time distance by chapa (bus) to nearest bank. Individual controls include age, gender, years of education, 
marital status dummies, religion dummies, ethnic group dummies, and property. 
17 
individual level was 172 Meticais (close to 6 USD), and the average number of transactions was 
5.7 – these values do not take into account individuals performing no transactions. By looking at 
the difference between targeted and untargeted individuals, we can conclude that targeted 
individuals were more likely to have used mKesh. The point estimate was 0.57-0.58 percentage 
points, which was statistically significant at the 1 percent level for all specifications employed. 
Differences across targeted and untargeted were not significant for total value and number of 
transactions. 
 
We now look at specific types of transactions. 20 percent of our rural experimental subjects in 
treatment EAs performed a deposit. The average deposit was 223 Meticais, and the average 
number of deposits was 2.5. There is evidence that targeted individuals were 7-9 percentage 
points more likely (than untargeted individuals) to make a deposit. 13/2 percent of our treated 
sample received/sent a money transfer. The average values for the transfers were 60 (received) 
and 69.2 (sent) Meticais. The average number of transfers received was 1.3, and the average 
number of transfers sent was 1.1. Targeted individuals were 12 percentage points more likely to 
receive a transfer, and 2 percentage points more likely to send a transfer. Regarding purchases in 
shop, we find that 5 percent of our treated sample performs that transaction. The average value of 
those purchases was 121 Meticais, and the average number of those purchases was 1.5. Targeted 
individuals were 5 percentage points more likely to make a purchase in shop. Airtime purchases 
constitute the most popular mKesh operation: 30 percent of our experimental subjects in 
treatment locations performed at least one purchase of mCel airtime. The average value of the 
airtime was 124 Meticais, and the average number of airtime purchases was 5.5. Targeted 
individuals were 25-27 percentage points more likely to pay for airtime using mKesh. Finally, 
only 7 percent of our treated sample withdrew any money from their mKesh accounts. The 
average amount withdrawn was 148 Meticais, and the average number of withdrawals was 1.2. 
Targeted individuals were 7-8 percentage points more likely to withdraw any money from their 
mKesh balance. 
 
Our measurement design also included other measures of adoption. Apart from the self-reported 
intention to use mKesh gathered from the post-treatment survey, all the other measures we now 
analyze are behavioral. We look at whether targeted individuals wanted to withdraw the 50 
Meticais they got as mKesh balance at the end of the individual treatment – campaigners made 
themselves available to help targeted individuals withdrawing that money from their mKesh 
accounts. We also observe whether each individual in treatment locations actually sent an SMS 
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mKesh and an SMS mKesh migrant. Sending an SMS mKesh is interpreted as credible evidence 
that the individual is interested in helping to improve mKesh services; sending an SMS mKesh 
migrant is interpreted as credible evidence that the individual is planning to use mKesh for money 
transfers. Finally, we had a version of the remittance game for treatment locations only: subjects 
were only given two alternatives, sending the 20 Meticais through mKesh or through the default 
method (us) – they could not keep the 20 Meticais for themselves. Whether subjects decided to 
send the money transfer through mKesh constitutes our final measure of adoption of mKesh. For 
all these measures of adoption we focus on averages for treatment locations. See Table 4 for these 
adoption results. For all outcomes except withdraw 50 Meticais, we also present the difference 
between targeted and untargeted individuals within treatment locations (untargeted individuals 
were not given the 50 Meticais to begin with). The different specifications are as in Tables 3. 
 
<Table 4 near here> 
 
We find that 66 percent of the respondents in treatment locations indicated an intention to use 
mKesh. Targeted individuals were 45-46 percentage points more likely to indicate this intention. 
All these estimates, across the different specifications, are statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level.  
81 percent of our targeted respondents decided to keep the 50 Meticais in their mKesh account, 
i.e., they opted for not withdrawing this balance despite the expressed availability of campaigners 
to help them with the withdrawal. While there may be competing explanations for this finding, 
such as inertia or a desire to please campaigners, this result is at least an indicator that enough 
trust in the service was created so that targeted respondents chose to keep using the mKesh 
service to keep value, instead of immediately withdrawing the 50 Meticais at a minimal cost 
given the presence of the campaign team. 
The SMS behavioral measures were relatively unpopular. Still 7 percent of our experimental 
subjects sent an SMS mKesh. But only 2 percent sent an SMS mKesh Migrant. This may be 
related to the requirement that the rural respondent had to convince a corresponding Maputo 
migrant to send a specific text message: it may have been too exigent given the level of detail 
involved, and the distance between sender (rural subject) and receiver (urban migrant) of the 
detailed information. We do not identify statistically significant differences between targeted and 
untargeted individuals on the sending of the SMSs. Finally, we observe that 55 percent of our 
experimental subjects in treatment locations decided to send the 20-Metical transfer through 
mKesh. We do not find statistically significant differences between targeted and untargeted 
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individuals on the sending of the 20 Meticais through mKesh. Overall, the evidence gathered 
through these behavioral indicators of adoption leads us to conclude for a clear willingness to use 
mKesh services. As expected we sometimes see higher willingness to use mKesh for the targeted 
individuals in our sample for treatment EAs. 
 
4.3. Information and trust 
 
We now turn our attention to survey measures of financial literacy and knowledge about mKesh, 
as well as to survey measures of trust. The survey questions that serve as the basis of these 
measures are described in detail in Table 1. We follow Kling et al (2007) in that we normalize all 
our survey measures using z-scores. This procedure enables homogenization of the interpretation 
of our treatment effects. The z-scores are calculated by subtracting the control group mean and 
dividing by the control group standard deviation. Thus, each variable has mean 0 and standard 
deviation 1 for the control group. For each outcome we display in Tables 5 and 6 treatment 
effects are estimated from employing specifications (2), i.e., without any controls, and (4), i.e., 
including regional dummies and then adding location and individual controls. Note that we only 
consider data on targeted and control individuals in these regressions; hence, the treatment effects 
we show in the referred tables represent the difference between targeted and control groups of 
respondents. 
 
<Tables 5 near here> 
<Tables 6 near here> 
 
In Tables 5 we find the results concerning financial and mKesh literacy. Our measures of 
financial literacy are knowledge question about whether individuals understand the concepts of 
saving, transfer, deposit, and withdrawal. These are simple questions whose answers where 
classified as better or worse approximations of the full definitions. We can observe clear positive 
effects of the treatment. All effects are statistically significant at the 1 percent level, and robust 
across different specifications. Expressed in standard deviation units of the outcomes, these 
effects range 0.24-0.26 for savings, 0.29-034 for transfers, 0.26-0.28 for deposits, and 0.25-0.27 
for withdrawals. Even though there are small differences across the different outcomes, it is 
interesting to note that the largest effects are for transfers and the smallest for savings. Our 
outcomes linking to knowledge about mKesh relate to hearing about mKesh, what mKesh is, 
what institution sponsors mKesh, and what services can be got with mKesh. Again, answers by 
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respondents were coded according to being closer or more distant from complete definitions. As 
expected, targeted respondents show much higher levels of information about mKesh. All effects 
are statistically significant at the 1 percent level, and robust across different specifications. 
Results range 0.76-0.78 for heard about mKesh, 0.82-0.83 for what is mKesh, 0.95-0.96 for who 
sponsors mKesh, and 1.04-1.05 for what can be done with mKesh (all effects are expressed in 
standard deviation units). We may then conclude that the dissemination campaign was very 
effective at increasing the knowledge rural Mozambicans have about finance/banking and about 
mKesh. 
 
In Tables 6 we find the results regarding trust. We begin by showing measures of subjective 
general trust in family members, in neighbors, in the local shopkeeper, and in mCel. We observe 
clear positive effects of the mKesh dissemination efforts on increasing trust in the local 
shopkeeper. Indeed the local mKesh agent was typically the local shopkeeper, and so the mKesh 
campaign was able to bring additional trust to this local trader. This effect is statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level and robust across specifications. It ranges 0.21-0.27 standard 
deviation units. We also find a negative impact of the campaign on trust in neighbors. This is a 
0.13 effect, significant at the 5 percent level. However it turns insignificant when location and 
individual controls are added. Our best interpretation for this effect is that since the campaign 
underlined the security advantages of mKesh for storing money, i.e., PIN protection, over 
traditional methods of storing money under the mattress or with neighbors, this emphasis may 
have caused a shift from trusting in neighbors. We do not find statistically significant changes on 
trusting in family or in the cell phone operator mCel. We then analyze treatment effects on 
trusting money transfers carried out through different channels: via bus driver, via friend or 
family member, via bank transfer, and via ‘new mCel bank’ (this was the most parsimonious way 
to refer to mKesh in both treatment and control locations). We show results regarding the simple 
answers to these subjective questions (Table 6b). We also show results for adjusted measures of 
the same outcomes (Table 6c), in which we take into account hypothetical extreme situations 
(anchoring vignettes) in order to take into account individual approaches to the subjective scale. 
Specifically, we adjust for the average response in the two extreme anchoring vignettes 
corresponding to a given money transfer method. Refer to Table 1 for the vignettes employed in 
each of these measures of trust. Hence, the adjusted measures attempt to account for the different 
pre-disposition of individuals to trust or distrust each channel. For both unadjusted and adjusted 
measures of trust, we only find statistically significant effects for trust in transfer via ‘new Mcel 
bank’. These effects are 0.38-0.44 (unadjusted) and 0.26-0.30 (adjusted), and are significant at the 
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1 percent level. Classical methods for money transfer do not seem to have either benefitted or 
suffered from the treatment. We can conclude that the mKesh dissemination activities increased 
trust in local shopkeepers and in money transfers with the help of mCel. 
 
4.4. Savings and remittances 
 
We conducted games aimed to measure the willingness of our experimental subjects to save and 
remit. Since these behavioral measures were gathered in a setting where decisions were made 
against real money, they may be used to credibly show whether we should anticipate real effects 
of mKesh on savings and remittances. The assumption is that changes in the marginal willingness 
to save and remit translate into similar changes in the total savings these households hold and 
remittances these households send over a meaningful period of time. Note that the sending of 
small remittances in our games can always be interpreted as signaling the existence of the new 
method for transferring method and the need to receive remittances from urban migrants in the 
closest family. Hence, despite the fact that objectively we only measure willingness of our rural 
sample to send money, we may (less objectively) interpret effects on receiving remittances in the 
same direction. We show the corresponding results in Table 7. For each outcome we display in 
treatment effects without employing any controls, with regional dummies only, and with regional 
dummies as well as location and individual controls. Our focus is on contrasting targeted 
respondents to control respondents. 
 
<Table 7 near here> 
 
We show treatment effects both on willingness to save/remit and willingness to save/remit 
through mKesh. All dependent variables are binary. We find that overall willingness to remit 
increases with mKesh dissemination, while overall willingness to save does not seem to increase 
(not significantly at standard statistical levels). The overall effect on remittances is 6-7 percentage 
points. This estimate is statistically significant at the 5 or 10 percent levels. We also observe that 
the willingness to save through mKesh and the willingness to remit through mKesh clearly 
increase when comparing targeted and control experimental subjects. For savings the effect is 23-
25 percentage points. For remittances the effect is 26-27 percentage points. All these estimates 
are significant at the 1 percent level. We infer from these results that the dissemination of mKesh 
induced an increase on the willingness to send money transfers independently of the money 
transfer method, and that at the margin mKesh substituted traditional methods of saving and 
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remitting. We see these results as an interesting indication of what may be longer-term effects of 
mobile money on savings and remittances of rural households in Mozambique. 
 
4.5. Spillovers 
 
We now devote our attention to the comparison between untargeted individuals in treatment 
locations and control individuals. We look at the main experimental outcomes from before, i.e. 
information and trust survey measures, and savings and remittances behavioral measures. The 
corresponding treatment effects may be interpreted as spillover effects given that untargeted 
individuals were not individually approached by mKesh campaigners. Note however that these 
spillovers may be due to attendance at the community meeting or the community theatre that 
were held for mKesh dissemination (despite the fact that only targeted individuals were explicitly 
invited). Other possible explanation for the spillover effects is social network transmission 
through the targeted. See Tables 8 for the results. The specifications we employ are depicted in 
equations (2) and (4) when employing untargeted and control individual data. We display 
estimates of treatment effects when employing no controls, when adding regional dummies, and 
when adding location and individual controls in addition to regional dummies. 
 
<Tables 8 near here> 
 
We look for spillovers regarding knowledge about savings, knowledge about transfers, heard 
about mKesh, trust in local shopkeeper, and trust in transfer via ‘new mCel bank’ (adjusted by the 
corresponding anchoring vignettes). We had found clear treatment effects for all these outcomes 
when contrasting targeted and control respondents. We observe that knowledge about savings 
increased by 0.15-0.17 standard deviation units, significant at the 10 percent level. Knowledge 
about transfers increased by 0.22-0.34, significant at the 1 or 5 percent levels. Hearing about 
mKesh increased by 0.18-0.21, significant at the 5 or 10 percent levels. We do not see significant 
changes in trust measures, with the exception of trust in local shopkeeper when employing full 
controls. We seem to be able to report weaker but positive spillover effects on information and 
trust outcomes. Turning to the saving and remittance games, we estimate spillover effects for the 
marginal willingness to save/remit, and the marginal willingness to save/remit through mKesh. 
We find results similar to the ones encountered for the targeted vs. control comparison. Overall 
remittance increases by 9-12 percentage points for the untargeted. These estimates are significant 
at the 5 or 10 percent levels. Saving through mKesh and remittance through mKesh also increase 
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for the untargeted, by 0.15-0.19 and 0.24-0.31 percentage points respectively. These effects are 
significant at the 1 or 5 percent levels. We conclude that spillovers were significant for savings 
and remittances. These spillovers were in fact similar to the effects we identified for the 
individuals that were individually approached by campaigners. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper presented evidence on the impact of mobile money (mKesh) dissemination in rural 
Mozambique. Initial evidence points to a high rate of mKesh adoption, which is consistent with 
our finding that there were improvements in financial literacy and trust on local agents due to the 
introduction of mKesh in the treatment rural villages in our sample.  
 
We also find that the marginal willingness to send remittances increases after mKesh is made 
available. We do not however find the same result for savings. This result is in line with 
descriptive evidence for M-PESA in Kenya, which emphasizes the importance of mobile money 
in increasing remittances. We find that mKesh substitutes baseline methods for both saving and 
money transfers. 
 
This paper is about the first results of this experiment. We plan to continue disseminating mKesh 
through urban migrants with a direct kinship connection (spouses, sons/daughters) to our panel of 
rural experimental subjects. We will conduct a sub-experiment with urban migrants by deploying 
three types of dissemination treatments: one in which basic information about mKesh is given and 
some experimentation is induced (just like what we did for their rural counterparts), one in which 
in addition to the first we subsidize mKesh operations by giving a price bonus per transactions 
(price margin), and one in which in addition to the first we give an initial mKesh balance for 
improving trust in the service (trust margin). The migrants will be contacted face-to-face – this 
contact will allow gathering survey and behavioral information from these migrants. Our main 
objective is to study the determinants of adoption of mKesh services, with a particular focus on 
remittances. Crucially we plan to continue measuring adoption at both rural and urban ends of our 
enlarged panel (i.e., including the migrants) by making use of mKesh administrative records. We 
will revisit our rural subjects to conduct a fully-fledged household survey, comparable with the 
baseline one we already conducted. Savings and remittances are hypothesized to be central to 
mediating any effects we may find on consumption and investment patterns of these rural 
households. 
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Of course the research agenda on the impact of mobile money is endless. Much more should be 
done on understanding how mobile money as a platform can carry a plethora of financial services 
that can be of great impact for unbanked populations. These services can go from simple savings 
accounts to more complex financial products related to farmer insurance. Since mobile money 
platforms can represent a revolution in banking, and banking is an industry requiring specific 
regulation by central banks that needs to be well informed, rigorous impact evaluation of mobile 
money introduction can shape the way the revolution may happen. 
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Checking balance. 
Paying for expenses at the mKesh shop.
Other operations and pricing:
Transfer. 
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Withdrawal. 
Pricing. 
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Figure 2: Experimental locations 
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Figure 3: SMS mKesh 
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Figure 4: SMS mKesh Migrant 
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Figure 5: Envelopes for default options in savings and remittance games 
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Table 1: Information and trust survey outcomes - phrasing (English translations) and scales.
variable phrasing of the question
original 
scale
knowledge about savings
Please tell me what can be understood as savings. Answers ranged from the respondent not knowing to the respondent 
mentioning keeping money for later (to reach an objective or deal with an emergency).
1 to 3
knowledge about transfers
Please tell me what can be understood as money transfer. Answers ranged from the respondent not knowing to the 
respondent mentioning the passing money from one person to another.
1 to 3
knowledge about deposits
Please tell me what can be understood as bank deposit. Answers ranged from the respondent not knowing to the respondent 
mentioning going to the bank to ask them to keep some money. Other.
1 to 3
knowledge about withdrawals
Please tell me what can be understood as bank withdrawal. Answers ranged from the respondent not knowing to the 
respondent mentioning going to the bank to take out some money.
1 to 3
heard about mKesh Have you heard about mKesh? Possible answers: No-Yes. 0 - 1
what is mKesh 
What is mKesh? Answers ranged from the respondent not knowing to the respondent mentioning that mKesh is mCel's 
mobile money provider 'the bank in your hand' (mKesh slogan).
1 to 7
who sponsors mKesh Who sponsors mKesh? mCel/Other/Does not know 0 to 2
what can be done with mKesh
Which services does mKesh offer?  Answer summarizes total number of correct answers, ranging from the respondent 
mentioning deposits, withdrawals, transfers, saving on the cell phone, paying for goods in shop, buying mCel airtime.
0 to 6
general trust
How much do you trust the following people? Your family/Your neighbors/ Local shopkeepers/mCel. Distrust a lot-Trust a 
lot.
1 to 5
(Extreme positive vignette:) Tobias has a family member living in Maputo who is going to send him 1000 Meticais via a bus 
driver that is his friend and that has been working as a bus driver for the last 5 years. The bus driver charges 50 Meticais for 
the service. How much do you trust that Tobias will receive this money? Distrust a lot-Trust a lot
1 to 5
(Extreme negative vignette:) Samuel has a family member living in Maputo who is going to send him 1000 Meticais via a bus 
driver that he never saw before and that has been working as a bus driver for just the last 3 months. The bus driver charges 50 
Meticais for the service. How much do you trust that Samuel will receive this money? Distrust a lot-Trust a lot
1 to 5
How much do you trust that you will receive any money sent by your family in Maputo via a bus driver? Distrust a lot-
Trust a lot
1 to 5
(Extreme positive vignette:) Domingos has a family member living in Maputo who is going to send him 1000 Meticais via a 
brother that will visit the village. Domings pays a small gratification to his brother to thank the service. How much do you 
trust that Domingos will receive this money? Distrust a lot-Trust a lot
1 to 5
(Extreme negative vignette:) Horácio has a family member living in Maputo who is going to send him 1000 Meticais via 
someone that will visit the village. Horácio pays a small gratification to that person to thank the service. How much do you 
trust that Horácio will receive this money? Distrust a lot-Trust a lot
1 to 5
How much do you trust that you will receive any money sent by your family in Maputo via a friend or family member 
visiting you village? Distrust a lot-Trust a lot
1 to 5
(Extreme positive vignette:) Lucas has a family member living in Maputo who is going to send him 1000 Meticais via a bank 
transfer to the local agency of BIM (a large Mozambican bank) which is 30min away from Lucas' village. How much do you 
trust that Lucas will receive this money? Distrust a lot-Trust a lot
1 to 5
(Extreme negative vignette:) Elias has a family member living in Maputo who is going to send him 1000 Meticais via a bank 
transfer to the local agency of a small and unknown bank which is 30min away from Elias' village. How much do you trust 
that Elias will receive this money? Distrust a lot-Trust a lot
1 to 5
How much do you trust that you will receive any money sent by your family in Maputo via a bank transfer? Distrust a 
lot-Trust a lot
1 to 5
(Extreme positive vignette:) Pedro has a family member living in Maputo who is going to send him 1000 Meticais via a bank 
transfer to new local branch of the new mCel bank, which happens to be in the center of the village. How much do you trust 
that Pedro will receive this money? Distrust a lot-Trust a lot
1 to 5
(Extreme negative vignette:) Daniel has a family member living in Maputo who is going to send him 1000 Meticais via a 
bank transfer to new local branch of the new mCel bank, which is 30min away by bus from his village. How much do you 
trust that Daniel will receive this money? Distrust a lot-Trust a lot
1 to 5
How much do you trust that you will receive any money sent by your family in Maputo via the new mCel bank which 
works from a shop in your village? Distrust a lot-Trust a lot
1 to 5
transfer via 'new mCel bank'
financial literacy
information abot mKesh
transfer via bus driver
transfer via friend or family
transfer via bank
trust on transfers (with vignettes)
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Table 2a: Differences across treatment and control locations.
control treatment difference
0.940 0.979 0.039
(0.040)
0.389 0.247 -0.143
(0.091)
0.646 0.719 0.073
(0.093)
0.603 0.555 -0.048
(0.099)
0.510 0.501 -0.010
(0.100)
0.981 0.981 -0.001
(0.027)
0.468 0.382 -0.087
(0.098)
0.619 0.427 -0.192*
(0.098)
0.136 0.090 -0.046
(0.062)
4.621 2.319 -2.302
(1.798)
0.249 0.213 -0.035
(0.084)
0.706 0.723 0.017
(0.090)
31.311 28.260 -3.050
(3.062)
61.377 102.779 41.402
(36.368)
price of transportation to the nearest bank - MT
time distance to nearest bank - minutes
Note: Standard errors of the differences reported in parenthesis; standard errors are corrected by clustering at 
the location (enumeration area) level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
has land road access
has primary school
has secondary school
has health center
has police
has church
has meeting point
has electricity supply
has sewage
has paved road access
has market vendors
quality of mCel coverage
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Table 2b: Differences across treatment-targeted, treatment-untargeted, and control groups.
control
treatment - 
targeted
difference to 
targeted group
treatment - 
untargeted
difference to 
untargeted 
group
38.524 36.888 -1.636 37.364 -1.160
(1.054) (1.452)
0.627 0.609 -0.018 0.682 0.054
(0.036) (0.046)
5.554 5.736 0.182 5.380 -0.174
(0.312) (0.406)
0.176 0.200 0.024 0.168 -0.008
(0.023) (0.037)
0.665 0.644 -0.021 0.670 0.005
(0.029) (0.039)
0.052 0.057 0.005 0.061 0.010
(0.011) (0.018)
0.107 0.098 -0.009 0.101 -0.006
(0.018) (0.024)
0.464 0.427 -0.037 0.455 -0.009
(0.040) (0.060)
0.087 0.106 0.019 0.146 0.059
(0.019) (0.039)
0.063 0.073 0.010 0.073 0.010
(0.015) (0.023)
0.050 0.064 0.014 0.045 -0.005
(0.015) (0.019)
0.046 0.061 0.015 0.043 -0.003
(0.014) (0.019)
0.350 0.307 -0.043 0.310 -0.040
(0.035) (0.049)
0.170 0.193 0.023 0.217 0.048
(0.035) (0.049)
0.401 0.419 0.018 0.418 0.017
(0.040) (0.053)
3.797 3.732 -0.065 3.839 0.041
(0.104) (0.137)
0.706 0.688 -0.019 0.706 -0.000
(0.082) (0.084)
0.075 0.069 -0.007 0.051 -0.025
(0.042) (0.043)
0.135 0.129 -0.006 0.141 0.006
(0.056) (0.063)
0.051 0.082 0.030 0.073 0.022
(0.040) (0.039)
Note: Standard errors of the differences reported in parenthesis; standard errors are corrected by clustering at the location (enumeration area) level. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
religion and 
ethnic group
non-religious
catholic
zion
other christian
religious intensity
changana
bitonga
chitsua
chopi
occupation
farmer 
vendor
manual worker
teacher
basic 
demographics
age
gender
years of education
single
married
separated
widowed
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Table 2c: Differences across treatment-targeted, treatment-untargeted, and control groups.
control
treatment - 
targeted
difference to 
targeted group
treatment - 
untargeted
difference to 
untargeted 
group
2,734.241 2,638.780 -95.461 3,011.838 277.597
(420.717) (725.576)
0.863 0.883 0.020 0.887 0.024
(0.028) (0.037)
0.362 0.465 0.103*** 0.441 0.079
(0.038) (0.050)
0.277 0.354 0.077 0.328 0.051
(0.048) (0.054)
0.588 0.679 0.091** 0.688 0.100**
(0.037) (0.049)
0.283 0.315 0.031 0.263 -0.020
(0.030) (0.042)
0.555 0.558 0.002 0.565 0.010
(0.049) (0.061)
0.146 0.106 -0.039* 0.118 -0.027
(0.023) (0.031)
0.031 0.042 0.011 0.038 0.007
(0.010) (0.022)
0.512 0.513 0.001 0.500 -0.012
(0.031) (0.048)
0.395 0.355 -0.039 0.357 -0.038
(0.044) (0.054)
0.164 0.181 0.016 0.114 -0.050
(0.031) (0.035)
0.017 0.027 0.011* 0.016 -0.000
(0.006) (0.013)
0.067 0.044 -0.024** 0.032 -0.035**
(0.010) (0.015)
4.823 4.824 (0.001) (4.876) (0.053)
0.032 0.043
0.265 0.310 0.045 0.202 -0.063
(0.035) (0.044)
0.218 0.211 -0.007 0.200 -0.018
(0.031) (0.044)
4,731 5,312 (581) 3,268.521 -1,463
975 (897.834)
0.041 0.033 -0.008 0.034 -0.006
(0.010) (0.015)
0.056 0.040 -0.015 0.046 -0.009
(0.012) (0.019)
Note: Standard errors of the differences reported in parenthesis; standard errors are corrected by clustering at the location (enumeration area) level. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
technology and 
finance
frequency of cell use
has bank account
participates in rosca
total savings - MT
has bank loan
has family loan
owns car
income and 
property
individual monthly income - MT
machamba
has goats
has pigs
has chicken
has ducks
owns mosquito net
owns fridge
owns sewing machine
owns radio
owns tv
owns bike
owns motorcycle
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Table 3a: Adoption outcomes - administrative records on all transactions (per individual).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
0.635 0.635 0.633 172.276 172.276 154.648 5.693 5.693 5.059
(0.482) (0.482) (0.482) (795.276) (795.276) (640.328) (19.256) (19.256) (9.434)
coefficient 0.583*** 0.584*** 0.571*** 7.884 -20.488 3.322 -0.008 -0.608 -0.467
standard error (0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (78.588) (74.663) (82.222) (2.218) (2.104) (2.363)
0.223 0.222 0.227 -0.002 0.008 0.057 -0.002 0.006 0.127
993 993 912 631 631 577 631 631 577
no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
no no yes no no yes no no yes
Note: All regressions are OLS. Average value of transactions and number of transactions are computed for individuals that actually performed transactions. Controls are individual 
demographic and location characteristics, which include age, gender, years of education, marital status dummies, religion dummies, ethnic group dummies, property, and location 
offering primary school, secondary school, health center, market vendors, police, church, meeting point, electricity supply, sewage, quality of mCel coverage, and time distance by 
chapa (bus) to nearest bank. Standard errors reported in parenthesis; these are corrected by clustering at the location (enumeration area) level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%.
mean (treatment locations)
standard deviation
treatment effect (targeted vs. 
untargeted)
r-squared adjusted
number of observations
regional dummies
controls
dependent variable ------>
all transactions
at least one transaction average value of transactions (>0) number of transactions (>0)
Table 3b: Adoption outcomes - administrative records on deposits (per individual).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
0.203 0.203 0.197 223.198 223.198 196.606 2.446 2.446 2.189
(0.403) (0.403) (0.398) (687.485) (687.485) (552.037) (4.841) (4.841) (2.363)
coefficient 0.085** 0.087*** 0.065* 137.403** 71.113 64.944 0.782 0.310 0.456
standard error (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (68.793) (56.669) (64.472) (0.532) (0.477) (0.552)
0.006 0.016 0.071 -0.001 0.019 0.102 -0.002 0.013 0.165
993 993 912 202 202 180 202 202 180
no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
no no yes no no yes no no yes
treatment effect (targeted vs. 
untargeted)
r-squared adjusted
number of observations
regional dummies
controls
Note: All regressions are OLS. Average value of transactions and number of transactions are computed for individuals that actually performed transactions. Controls are individual 
demographic and location characteristics, which include age, gender, years of education, marital status dummies, religion dummies, ethnic group dummies, property, and location 
offering primary school, secondary school, health center, market vendors, police, church, meeting point, electricity supply, sewage, quality of mCel coverage, and time distance by 
chapa (bus) to nearest bank. Standard errors reported in parenthesis; these are corrected by clustering at the location (enumeration area) level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%.
mean (treatment locations)
standard deviation
dependent variable ------>
deposits
at least one transaction average value of transactions (>0) number of transactions (>0)
Table 3c: Adoption outcomes - administrative records on transfers received (per individual).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
0.126 0.126 0.128 59.984 59.984 60.162 1.272 1.272 1.274
(0.332) (0.332) (0.335) (87.917) (87.917) (90.656) (0.559) (0.559) (0.567)
coefficient 0.115*** 0.116*** 0.118*** 24.493** 13.961 2.443 -0.590** -0.608** -0.973***
standard error (0.033) (0.034) (0.038) (11.518) (10.237) (33.432) (0.270) (0.273) (0.335)
0.017 0.018 0.052 -0.005 0.049 0.134 0.044 0.033 0.152
993 993 912 125 125 117 125 125 117
no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
no no yes no no yes no no yes
Note: All regressions are OLS. Average value of transactions and number of transactions are computed for individuals that actually performed transactions. Controls are individual 
demographic and location characteristics, which include age, gender, years of education, marital status dummies, religion dummies, ethnic group dummies, property, and location 
offering primary school, secondary school, health center, market vendors, police, church, meeting point, electricity supply, sewage, quality of mCel coverage, and time distance by 
chapa (bus) to nearest bank. Standard errors reported in parenthesis; these are corrected by clustering at the location (enumeration area) level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%.
mean (treatment locations)
standard deviation
treatment effect (targeted vs. 
untargeted)
r-squared adjusted
number of observations
regional dummies
controls
dependent variable ------>
transfers received
at least one transaction average value of transactions (>0) number of transactions (>0)
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Table 3d: Adoption outcomes - administrative records on transfers sent (per individual).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
0.020 0.020 0.021 69.200 69.200 52.053 1.100 1.100 1.105
0.141 0.141 0.143 92.015 92.015 52.247 0.308 0.308 0.315
coefficient 0.018** 0.018** 0.016* 62.316** 30.333*** 107.431*** 0.105 -0.000 -0.103
standard error (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (24.484) (11.363) (28.841) (0.070) (0.000) (0.143)
0.002 0.001 0.021 -0.031 0.185 0.063 -0.049 0.120 0.327
993 993 912 20 20 19 20 20 19
no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
no no yes no no yes no no yes
regional dummies
controls
Note: All regressions are OLS. Average value of transactions and number of transactions are computed for individuals that actually performed transactions. Controls are individual 
demographic and location characteristics, which include age, gender, years of education, marital status dummies, religion dummies, ethnic group dummies, property, and location 
offering primary school, secondary school, health center, market vendors, police, church, meeting point, electricity supply, sewage, quality of mCel coverage, and time distance by 
chapa (bus) to nearest bank. Standard errors reported in parenthesis; these are corrected by clustering at the location (enumeration area) level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%.
mean (treatment locations)
standard deviation
treatment effect (targeted vs. 
untargeted)
r-squared adjusted
number of observations
dependent variable ------>
transfers sent
at least one transaction average value of transactions (>0) number of transactions (>0)
Table 3e: Adoption outcomes - administrative records on purchases in shop (per individual).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
0.052 0.052 0.050 121.173 121.173 128.870 1.519 1.519 1.565
(0.223) (0.223) (0.219) (344.330) (344.330) (365.392) (1.915) (1.915) (2.029)
coefficient 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.047** -21.041 -62.051 150.761 0.197 -0.103 0.602
standard error (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (107.797) (107.240) (217.547) (0.408) (0.365) (1.349)
0.005 0.018 0.087 -0.020 0.007 0.321 -0.019 0.054 0.377
993 993 912 52 52 46 52 52 46
no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
no no yes no no yes no no yes
Note: All regressions are OLS. Average value of transactions and number of transactions are computed for individuals that actually performed transactions. Controls are individual 
demographic and location characteristics, which include age, gender, years of education, marital status dummies, religion dummies, ethnic group dummies, property, and location 
offering primary school, complete primary school, secondary school, health center, police services, religious services, meeting point,  electricity, sewage, mcel coverage, price and 
time distance by chapa (bus) to nearest bank. Standard errors reported in parenthesis; these are corrected by clustering at the location (enumeration area) level. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
mean (treatment locations)
standard deviation
treatment effect (targeted vs. 
untargeted)
r-squared adjusted
number of observations
regional dummies
controls
dependent variable ------>
purchases in shop
at least one transaction average value of transactions (>0) number of transactions (>0)
Table 3f: Adoption outcomes - administrative records on airtime purchases (per individual).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
0.301 0.301 0.297 123.619 123.619 107.129 5.498 5.498 4.376
(0.459) (0.459) (0.457) (412.536) (412.536) (247.110) (22.472) (22.472) (9.285)
coefficient 0.265*** 0.266*** 0.251*** 33.538 15.088 -0.319 1.583 0.612 -0.184
standard error (0.040) (0.041) (0.042) (53.918) (52.263) (55.348) (2.781) (2.610) (2.817)
0.050 0.061 0.127 -0.003 0.029 0.094 -0.003 0.028 0.129
993 993 912 299 299 271 299 299 271
no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
no no yes no no yes no no yes
treatment effect (targeted vs. 
untargeted)
r-squared adjusted
number of observations
regional dummies
controls
Note: All regressions are OLS. Average value of transactions and number of transactions are computed for individuals that actually performed transactions. Controls are individual 
demographic and location characteristics, which include age, gender, years of education, marital status dummies, religion dummies, ethnic group dummies, property, and location 
offering primary school, complete primary school, secondary school, health center, police services, religious services, meeting point,  electricity, sewage, mcel coverage, price and 
time distance by chapa (bus) to nearest bank. Standard errors reported in parenthesis; these are corrected by clustering at the location (enumeration area) level. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
mean (treatment locations)
standard deviation
dependent variable ------>
airtime
at least one transaction average value of transactions (>0) number of transactions (>0)
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Table 3g: Adoption outcomes - administrative records on withdrawals (per individual).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
0.067 0.067 0.068 147.612 147.612 151.452 1.179 1.179 1.194
(0.251) (0.251) (0.252) (366.119) (366.119) (379.487) (0.903) (0.903) 0.938
coefficient 0.076*** 0.075*** 0.074*** -43.030 106.250 760.346*** 0.182 0.458 1.516**
standard error (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (45.194) (109.157) (290.604) (0.115) (0.290) (0.661)
0.013 0.015 0.021 -0.015 0.052 0.188 -0.015 0.010 0.154
993 993 912 67 67 62 67 67 62
no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
no no yes no no yes no no yes
Note: All regressions are OLS. Average value of transactions and number of transactions are computed for individuals that actually performed transactions. Controls are individual 
demographic and location characteristics, which include age, gender, years of education, marital status dummies, religion dummies, ethnic group dummies, property, and location 
offering primary school, complete primary school, secondary school, health center, police services, religious services, meeting point,  electricity, sewage, mcel coverage, price and 
time distance by chapa (bus) to nearest bank. Standard errors reported in parenthesis; these are corrected by clustering at the location (enumeration area) level. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
at least one transaction average value of transactions (>0) number of transactions (>0)
mean (treatment locations)
standard deviation
dependent variable ------>
withdrawals
treatment effect (targeted vs. 
untargeted)
r-squared adjusted
number of observations
regional dummies
controls
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Table 4: Adoption outcomes - behavioral measures.
withdraw 
50 MT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
0.662 0.662 0.669 0.194 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.546 0.546 0.534
(0.467) (0.467) (0.464) (0.395) (0.259) (0.259) (0.261) (0.147) (0.147) (0.150) (0.498) (0.498) (0.499)
coefficient 0.457*** 0.461*** 0.454*** 0.003 0.003 -0.002 -0.006 -0.006 -0.009 0.085 0.096 0.085
standard error (0.047) (0.047) (0.049) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059)
0.145 0.163 0.198 -0.001 -0.003 0.017 -0.001 -0.002 0.010 0.003 0.102 0.107
993 993 912 993 993 912 993 993 912 678 678 626
no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
no no yes no no yes no no yes no no yes
mKesh mandatory remittance
Note: All regressions are OLS. Controls are individual demographic and location characteristics, which include age, gender, years of education, marital status dummies, religion dummies, ethnic group dummies, property, 
and location offering primary school, secondary school, health center, market vendors, police, church, meeting point, electricity supply, sewage, quality of mCel coverage, and time distance by chapa (bus) to nearest bank. 
Standard errors reported in parenthesis; these are corrected by clustering at the location (enumeration area) level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
standard deviation
treatment effect (targeted vs. 
untargeted)
r-squared adjusted
number of observations
regional dummies
controls
mean (treatment locations)
dependent variable ------> sms mKesh - actual sms mKesh migrant - actualintend to use mKesh
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Table 5a: Financial literacy outcomes.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
coefficient 0.257*** 0.242*** 0.261*** 0.301*** 0.287*** 0.336*** 0.274*** 0.262*** 0.278*** 0.262*** 0.250*** 0.270***
standard error (0.066) (0.054) (0.055) (0.069) (0.062) (0.051) (0.068) (0.063) (0.050) (0.065) (0.060) (0.049)
-0.118 -0.118 -0.096 -0.141 -0.141 -0.118 -0.118 -0.118 -0.091 -0.112 -0.112 -0.084
0.016 0.055 0.124 0.022 0.041 0.155 0.018 0.033 0.157 0.016 0.031 0.161
1,829 1,829 1,681 1,829 1,829 1,681 1,829 1,829 1,681 1,829 1,829 1,681
no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
no no yes no no yes no no yes no no yes
Note: All regressions are OLS. All dependent variables are z-scores. Controls are individual demographic and location characteristics, which include age, gender, years of education, marital status dummies, 
religion dummies, ethnic group dummies, property, and location offering primary school, secondary school, health center, market vendors, police, church, meeting point, electricity supply, sewage, quality of 
mCel coverage, and time distance by chapa (bus) to nearest bank. Standard errors reported in parenthesis; these are corrected by clustering at the location (enumeration area) level. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
dependent variable ------> knowledge about savings knowledge about transfers knowledge about deposits knowledge about withdrawals
treatment effect
mean dep. variable (control)
r-squared adjusted
number of observations
regional dummies
controls
Table 5b: mKesh literacy outcomes.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
coefficient 0.783*** 0.779*** 0.763*** 0.824*** 0.817*** 0.838*** 0.959*** 0.952*** 0.962*** 1.042*** 1.037*** 1.045***
standard error (0.074) (0.074) (0.068) (0.065) (0.062) (0.064) (0.070) (0.069) (0.063) (0.076) (0.077) (0.073)
-0.330 -0.330 -0.319 -0.342 -0.342 -0.338 -0.398 -0.398 -0.392 -0.440 -0.440 -0.433
0.150 0.155 0.248 0.162 0.172 0.221 0.223 0.230 0.304 0.263 0.266 0.317
1,806 1,806 1,661 1,832 1,832 1,684 1,832 1,832 1,684 1,832 1,832 1,684
no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
no no yes no no yes no no yes no no yes
Note: All regressions are OLS. All dependent variables are z-scores. Controls are individual demographic and location characteristics, which include age, gender, years of education, marital status dummies, 
religion dummies, ethnic group dummies, property, and location offering primary school, secondary school, health center, market vendors, police, church, meeting point, electricity supply, sewage, quality of 
mCel coverage, and time distance by chapa (bus) to nearest bank. Standard errors reported in parenthesis; these are corrected by clustering at the location (enumeration area) level. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
dependent variable ------> heard about mKesh what is mKesh who sponsors mKesh what can be done with mKesh
treatment effect
mean dep. variable (control)
r-squared adjusted
number of observations
regional dummies
controls
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
coefficient -0.026 -0.025 0.005 -0.131** -0.126** -0.084 0.212*** 0.215*** 0.265*** 0.102 0.095 0.082
standard error (0.067) (0.067) (0.060) (0.062) (0.060) (0.062) (0.064) (0.064) (0.057) (0.063) (0.061) (0.067)
0.009 0.009 0.011 0.056 0.056 0.060 -0.092 -0.092 -0.085 -0.046 -0.046 -0.035
-0.000 -0.000 0.027 0.004 0.007 0.048 0.011 0.011 0.045 0.002 0.008 0.013
1,823 1,823 1,675 1,820 1,820 1,673 1,794 1,794 1,650 1,803 1,803 1,660
no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
no no yes no no yes no no yes no no yes
Note: All regressions are OLS. All dependent variables are z-scores. Controls are individual demographic and location characteristics, which include age, gender, years of education, marital status dummies, 
religion dummies, ethnic group dummies, property, and location offering primary school, secondary school, health center, market vendors, police, church, meeting point, electricity supply, sewage, quality of 
mCel coverage, and time distance by chapa (bus) to nearest bank. Standard errors reported in parenthesis; these are corrected by clustering at the location (enumeration area) level. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
controls
Table 6a: General trust outcomes.
dependent variable ------> trust in family trust in neighbors trust in local shopkeeper trust in mCel
treatment effect
mean dep. variable (control)
r-squared adjusted
number of observations
regional dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
coefficient -0.008 -0.008 0.018 0.066 0.056 0.048 0.017 0.004 0.012 0.384*** 0.383*** 0.438***
standard error (0.062) (0.061) (0.059) (0.062) (0.057) (0.054) (0.070) (0.066) (0.070) (0.058) (0.058) (0.060)
-0.002 -0.002 0.014 -0.029 -0.029 -0.022 -0.007 -0.007 0.001 -0.174 -0.174 -0.194
-0.001 0.001 0.023 0.000 0.015 0.024 -0.001 0.016 0.043 0.036 0.035 0.045
1,736 1,736 1,594 1,751 1,751 1,611 1,690 1,690 1,555 1,663 1,663 1,528
no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
no no yes no no yes no no yes no no yes
Note: All regressions are OLS. All dependent variables are z-scores. Controls are individual demographic and location characteristics, which include age, gender, years of education, marital status dummies, 
religion dummies, ethnic group dummies, property, and location offering primary school, secondary school, health center, market vendors, police, church, meeting point, electricity supply, sewage, quality of 
mCel coverage, and time distance by chapa (bus) to nearest bank. Standard errors reported in parenthesis; these are corrected by clustering at the location (enumeration area) level. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
controls
Table 6b: Trust in money transfer channels - unadjusted measures.
dependent variable ------> trust in transfer via bus driver trust in transfer via friend or family trust in transfer via bank trust in transfer via 'new mCel bank'
treatment effect
mean dep. variable (control)
r-squared adjusted
number of observations
regional dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
coefficient 0.000 -0.005 -0.002 0.051 0.041 0.042 0.004 -0.011 -0.020 0.267*** 0.264*** 0.299***
standard error (0.061) (0.057) (0.056) (0.058) (0.051) (0.052) (0.072) (0.067) (0.069) (0.052) (0.052) (0.057)
-0.014 -0.014 0.006 -0.026 -0.026 -0.030 0.000 0.000 0.008 -0.117 -0.117 -0.136
-0.001 0.007 0.019 0.000 0.016 0.022 -0.001 0.018 0.042 0.017 0.017 0.023
1,694 1,694 1,557 1,697 1,697 1,563 1,618 1,618 1,487 1,612 1,612 1,479
no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
no no yes no no yes no no yes no no yes
Note: All regressions are OLS. All dependent variables are z-scores. Controls are individual demographic and location characteristics, which include age, gender, years of education, marital status dummies, 
religion dummies, ethnic group dummies, property, and location offering primary school, secondary school, health center, market vendors, police, church, meeting point, electricity supply, sewage, quality of 
mCel coverage, and time distance by chapa (bus) to nearest bank. Standard errors reported in parenthesis; these are corrected by clustering at the location (enumeration area) level. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
treatment effect
mean dep. variable (control)
r-squared adjusted
number of observations
regional dummies
controls
Table 6c: Trust in money transfer channels - adjusted measures.
dependent variable ------> trust in transfer via bus driver trust in transfer via friend or family trust in transfer via bank trust in transfer via 'new mCel bank'
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Table 7: Marginal willingness to save and remit.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
coefficient 0.020 0.021 0.043 0.229*** 0.229*** 0.249*** 0.057* 0.057* 0.067** 0.262*** 0.269*** 0.255***
standard error (0.039) (0.033) (0.037) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.029) (0.066) (0.056) (0.073)
0.588 0.588 0.579 0.115 0.115 0.117 0.161 0.161 0.151 0.459 0.459 0.429
-0.000 0.037 0.040 0.076 0.085 0.118 0.004 0.014 0.036 0.067 0.155 0.100
1,819 1,819 1,671 1,085 1,085 984 1,308 1,308 1,206 244 244 211
no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
no no yes no no yes no no yes no no yes
Note: All regressions are OLS. Controls are individual demographic and location characteristics, which include age, gender, years of education, marital status dummies, religion dummies, ethnic group 
dummies, property, and location offering primary school, secondary school, health center, market vendors, police, church, meeting point, electricity supply, sewage, quality of mCel coverage, and time distance 
by chapa (bus) to nearest bank. Standard errors reported in parenthesis; these are corrected by clustering at the location (enumeration area) level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%.
dependent variable ------> remittance game mKesh remittancesaving game mKesh saving
treatment effect
mean dep. variable (control)
r-squared adjusted
number of observations
regional dummies
controls
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Table 8b: Marginal willingness to save and remit - spillover effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
coefficient 0.034 0.030 0.046 0.155** 0.151** 0.188*** 0.089* 0.088* 0.115** 0.238** 0.256*** 0.311***
standard error (0.054) (0.050) (0.052) (0.062) (0.061) (0.064) (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.107) (0.093) (0.116)
0.588 0.588 0.579 0.115 0.115 0.117 0.161 0.161 0.151 0.459 0.459 0.429
-0.000 0.039 0.050 0.025 0.036 0.065 0.006 0.011 0.049 0.032 0.152 0.099
1,207 1,207 1,098 715 715 640 889 889 813 155 155 134
no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
no no yes no no yes no no yes no no yes
treatment effect
mean dep. variable (control)
r-squared adjusted
number of observations
regional dummies
controls
Note: All regressions are OLS. Controls are individual demographic and location characteristics, which include age, gender, years of education, marital status dummies, religion dummies, ethnic group 
dummies, property, and location offering primary school, secondary school, health center, market vendors, police, church, meeting point, electricity supply, sewage, quality of mCel coverage, and time distance 
by chapa (bus) to nearest bank. Standard errors reported in parenthesis; these are corrected by clustering at the location (enumeration area) level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%.
dependent variable ------> saving game mKesh saving remittance game mKesh remittance
Table 8a: Information and trust outcomes - spillover effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
coefficient 0.167* 0.154* 0.170* 0.231** 0.223** 0.342*** 0.180* 0.181* 0.205** 0.076 0.078 0.158* 0.045 0.047 0.119
standard error (0.100) (0.092) (0.103) (0.103) (0.099) (0.104) (0.107) (0.104) (0.103) (0.090) (0.088) (0.087) (0.091) (0.092) (0.100)
-0.118 -0.118 -0.096 -0.141 -0.141 -0.118 -0.330 -0.330 -0.319 -0.092 -0.092 -0.085 -0.117 -0.117 -0.136
0.003 0.052 0.120 0.006 0.025 0.154 0.004 0.008 0.172 -0.000 0.002 0.030 -0.001 -0.002 0.005
1,211 1,211 1,102 1,211 1,211 1,102 1,190 1,190 1,084 1,183 1,183 1,076 1,022 1,022 926
no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
no no yes no no yes no no yes no no yes no no yes
trust in transfer via 'new mCel bank'
Note: All regressions are OLS. All dependent variables are z-scores. Trust in transfer via 'new mCel bank' is adjusted by anchoring vignettes. Controls are individual demographic and location characteristics, which include age, gender, years of 
education, marital status dummies, religion dummies, ethnic group dummies, property, and location offering primary school, secondary school, health center, market vendors, police, church, meeting point, electricity supply, sewage, quality of mCel 
coverage, and time distance by chapa (bus) to nearest bank. Standard errors reported in parenthesis; these are corrected by clustering at the location (enumeration area) level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
dependent variable ------> knowledge about savings knowledge about transfers heard about mKesh trust in local shopkeeper
treatment effect
mean dep. variable (control)
r-squared adjusted
number of observations
regional dummies
controls
